Opening Statement

Ranking Member Conyers' Opening Statement at U.S. Secret Service Oversight Hearing

Washington, DC, November 19, 2014

Statement of Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr.
Hearing on:  Oversight of the United States Secret Service

Committee on the Judiciary

Wednesday, November 19, 2014 at 10:00 AM
2141 Rayburn Building

     Today, the Committee will examine the operation of an agency that performs two vital missions for our country:  the protection of the president and vice president and other dignitaries, and the protection of our payment and financial systems.

     The Secret Service has done an outstanding job in many instances, with respect to both missions.  The Secret Service helped protect the integrity of the nation’s economy by closing over 7,000 criminal cases in Fiscal Year 2014, leading to approximately 6,700 arrests.  This year alone, the agency’s efforts in investigating financial crimes have saved us $3 billion.  Cybercrime investigations prevented another $383 million in losses.

     With respect to the protection it provides the president, vice president, and their families, there is no doubt that the determined and dedicated agents of the Secret Service have provided—and continue to provide—a tremendous service to the nation.  However, in recent years, a number of incidents have shaken our trust in the agency, including lapses in protecting the president and the White House, and too many instances in which agents have engaged in misconduct while on presidential trips. 

     Most notable is the failure, in September of this year, to prevent a man from climbing over the fence and running across the White House lawn into the White House, making it all the way to the East Room before he was apprehended.  This incident demands that we change our approach to White House security, with lessons that should be applied to other aspects of presidential security as well. 

     First, we must replace the current White House fence with one designed to make it far less likely that anyone may successfully climb over it.  The current fence is not adequate.  It is too low and of a design that allows for handholds that are used to propel climbers over the fence.  While I understand that there may be historical considerations and concerns about how a more secure fence might look, I believe a new, more secure fence can be developed to afford greater protection while maintaining the dignity of the building and office it protects. 

     Next, we must improve the plan and systems for securing the White House from attack from anyone who is able to successfully climb over the fence.  When former director Julia Pierson testified before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on September 30th, she indicated that the breakdown in protection in the September 19 fence jumper incident was a problem of implementation and not a problem of the adequacy of the protective plan.  I disagree. 

     Yes, the evidence shows specific lapses in performance and the use of various alarm systems on September 19—but it also points to a broader set of problems.  I am concerned that the Secret Service has taken its protective plans and preparations for granted.  It is clear that the equipment, planning, and training that are supposed to protect the White House are inadequate.  All of these areas must be improved.  Unfortunately, we only know that because their deficiencies were exposed by a man who eluded all the Uniform Divisioned officers on post, the Emergency Response Team, and the canine unit on September 19th to make it all the way to the East Room. 

     Finally, I believe it will be necessary for experts outside of the Secret Service to contribute to regular reviews of the security plans and operations that protect the White House.  Secretary Johnson has appointed a panel of experts to make recommendations concerning the Secret Service and White House security on a one-time basis. However, I believe a similar group of experts should, perhaps on an annual basis, review the plans and operations related to the security of the White House complex. 

    Two decades ago, the Delta Force of the U.S. Army evaluated White House security and made a number of recommendations.  While I do not know whether these recommendations were good ones, I support the concept of experts from inside and perhaps outside the federal government providing security recommendations to the Secret Service.  I have no doubt that the agency takes its critical, protective mission very seriously.  However, the agency should not be alone in assessing the array of threats and types of attacks that could be attempted against the White House complex.  We cannot expect that future threats will be as simple as one individual jumping over the fence.  Our planning must involve thinking outside of the box.  I fear that current planning and review has been too insular, even if undertaken by a dedicated agency with the best of intentions.  I make these recommendations because we must improve the manner in which we protect our president, vice president, and their families. 

     This committee has always afforded the Secret Service a high degree of respect and gratitude on a bipartisan basis.  I trust that this will continue today and that this hearing will identify additional ways that a good agency may be strengthened so that it will do a better job at accomplishing its various missions.